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ABSTRACT 
Practitioners and some academics use potential dividends rather than actual payments to 
shareholders for valuing a firm’s equity. We underline the differences between the two methods 
and present some arguments supporting the thesis that firm valuation with potential dividends 
overstate the actual value of the firm’s equity. In particular, consistently with DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2006, 2007), we underline that cash flows create value for shareholders only if they 
are withdrawn from the firm, and that the use of potential dividends may lead to contradictions.  
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Introduction 
This paper gives support to the idea that potential dividends that are not distributed (and 
are invested in liquid assets) should be neglected in firm valuation, because only distributed cash 
flows add value to shareholders. Hence, the definition of Cash Flow to Equity should include 
only the cash flow that is actually paid to shareholders (dividends paid plus share repurchases 
minus new equity investment). Although some authors warn against the use of potential 
dividends for valuing firms (Vélez-Pareja, 1999, 2004, 2005; Fernández, 2002, 2007; Tham and 
Vélez-Pareja, 2004; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, 2007), some respected authors (e.g. 
Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 1994, 2000; Benninga and Sarig, 1997; Brealey and Myers, 2003; 
Damodaran, 1999, 2006, 2007)1 and many practitioners seem to support the idea that the Cash 
Flow to Equity has to include undistributed potential dividends, i.e. excess cash.  
 
To include undistributed potential dividends in valuation is admissible if two hypotheses hold: 
(i)  excess cash is expected to be invested in zero-NPV activities and (ii) all the cash from those 
investments is distributed, sooner or later, to shareholders.2 If these two assumptions held, 
potential dividends could be safely used for valuing firms, because they would be value-neutral 
(see DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006; Magni, 2007). But it should be noted that a definition of 
Cash Flow to Equity is meant to be valid for all possible cases, and thus should not depend on a 
particular assumption about investment in liquid assets, otherwise the consequent definition of 
firm value would depend on a particular assumption about investment in liquid assets. 
Furthermore, these assumptions disregard Jensen’s (1986) agency theory: if agency problems 
are present, managers tend to retain funds and invest them in negative-NPV projects, which 
implies that dividend irrelevance does not apply any more. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) 
claim that “When MM’s assumptions are relaxed to allow retention, payout policy matters in 
exactly the same sense that investment policy does” (p. 293) and “irrelevance fails because some 
feasible payout policies do not distribute the full present value of FCF to currently outstanding 
shares” (p. 294).  
This paper aims at reinforcing the arguments on the inappropriateness of adding the excess cash 
as part of the cash flows used for valuing a firm.  
 
                                                            
1 Professor Tom Copeland in a private correspondence says: “If funds are kept within the firm you still own them -- hence 
‘potential dividends’ are cash flow available to shareholders, whether or not they are paid out now or in the future.” 
2 This second assumption is not necessary if one assumes that the firm shuts down after T<∞ periods. At time T, 
managers will necessarily have to distribute the firm’s liquidation value (inclusive of the cash from investments in 
liquid assets) to shareholders. 
 4
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 shows that our definition of Cash Flow to Equity as 
dividends minus net capital contributions is consistent with basic finance, and, in particular, 
with Modigliani and Miller’s approach to valuation, whereas the definition widely used in many 
applied corporate finance textbooks and in real-life applications is not; section 2 reviews the 
different views of several corporate finance authors. Section 3 furnishes several reasons for 
supporting our thesis, among which confusion between investment value and distribution value 
and inconsistency between cash flows and financial statements. Section 4 finally illustrates three 
simple formal arguments. Some concluding remarks end the paper (main notational conventions 
are collected after this section). 
 
1. Definition(s) of Cash Flow to Equity   
This section proposes a definition of Cash Flow to Equity which is consistent with 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) and Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) approach to valuation.  
Let EBV be the equity book value and CSt+1 be the capital stock contributed by shareholders up 
to time t+1. As known, change in equity book value is equal to change in capital stock plus net 
income (NI) minus dividends paid to shareholders (Div): 
EBVt+1−EBVt  ≡ CSt+1−CSt+NIt+1−Divt+1. 
Using the variation symbol “d”,3  dEBVt+1 = EBVt+1−EBVt  is the change in equity book value 
and dCSt+1 = CSt+1−CSt represents the net capital contributions made by shareholders in the year 
(i.e. dCSt+1 = new equity investment – shares repurchases).  Therefore, we may rewrite the 
above equation as 
dEBVt+1 = NIt+1 − (Divt+1−dCSt+1)    (1) 
which is known in accounting finance as clean surplus relation. Note that increase in book value 
is split into two terms: NIt is an accounting item, whereas (Divt+1−dCSt+1) is a cash flow; in 
particular, the latter represents the cash flow that equity holders actually receive (net of capital 
contributions made during the year). It is just this cash flow that adds value to the firm. We 
therefore define Cash Flow to Equity as 
CFEt+1  ≡ Divt+1−dCSt+1.     (2) 
                                                            
3 Henceforth, change in a variable y is defined as: dyt+1:= yt+1−yt. 
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It is worth noting that our eq. (1) is equivalent to Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) eq. (4) at p. 
414, according to which 
 
Issuance of New Equity = Increase in book value  − (Net Income−Dividends) 
 
dCSt+1 = dEBVt+1 − (NIt+1 − Divt+1). 
 
(we remind that Miller and Modigliani assume no share repurchases so that dCSt+1=0). Our 
notion of CFE in eq. (2) is exactly what Miller and Modigliani (1961) use to compute the firm 
value: their eq. (17) at p. 419 highlights the difference between dividends paid and net capital 
contributions: using our symbols, their formula is  
]E)dCSDiv[(
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where Et is the equity market value at time t (and ρ  is Miller and Modigliani’s symbol for the 
cost of equity capital). It is worth noting that Miller and Modigliani (henceforth MM) also 
propose the (equivalent) stream of earnings approach to valuation. Their eq. (9)  is as follows: 
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Inspecting the numerator, the reader may note that our eqs. (1) and (2) just imply  
 
CFEt+1 = NIt+1−dEBVt+1,      (3) 
so that ∑∞
= +
+
+= 0 1
1t
0 )(1
CFE
E
t
tρ . As a result, our approach is consistent with MM’s approach. While 
it is true that Miller and Modigliani (1961) aim at giving a dividend irrelevance theorem in their 
paper, it is also true that they are perfectly aware of the stringent assumption they explicitly 
make: irrelevance of dividend policy is based on the coincidence of the cost of capital with the 
expected rate of return of the extra funds, which means that the activities undertaken (whether 
investment or financing) are zero-NPV activities. Without that assumption, the theorem breaks 
down. 
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By contrast, a large part of practitioners and some corporate finance scholars overlook 
that assumption and are willing to propose a different definition of cash flow to equity including 
excess cash. For example, Damodaran (1998, 2006a, 2006b) proposes the use of cash flow 
available for distribution for valuing a firm’s equity, even if it will be not paid to the equity 
holder. The cash available for distribution is usually called potential dividends; the part of it 
which is not actually distributed (excess cash, retained funds) is invested in liquid assets, i.e. 
cash and short-term investments such as securities, bonds etc. Formally, LAt=Ct+STIt 
(LA=liquid assets, C=cash, STI=short-term investments). Damodaran’s definition of cash flow 
to equity (he calls it Free Cash Flow to Equity) is widely adopted in applied corporate finance, 
and may be formalized, in relation to our definition, as follows: 
 
 FCFEt+1  = CFEt+1+excess casht+1     (3) 
 
Therefore, FCFEt+1 represents potential dividends, divided into actual net payments CFE and 
excess cash. The latter is given by the difference between change in liquid assets and after-tax 
interest income (see also Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000). Formally,  
 
Excess casht+1 = dLAt+1−iLAt(1-T)     (4) 
 
where i is the return rate for investment in liquid assets. We may see the same thing starting 
from the balance sheet. Let us divide the assets of the firm into two categories: Fixed Assets net 
of cumulated depreciation (NFA), and Working Capital (WC), the latter being the difference 
between current assets (cash+short-term investments+accounts receivable+inventories) and 
current liabilities (accounts payable). Then, 
 
EBVt = NFAt+WCt − Dt     (5) 
where WCt+1 = Ct+1 + STIt+1 + ARt+1 + Invt+1 – APt+1 (with Inv=Inventories) and D is the book 
value of the debt. Therefore,  
 
dEBVt+1 = dNFAt+1+dWCt+1 − dDt+1. 
 
Hence, making use of eq. (3), CFE may also be computed with the so-called indirect method: 
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CFEt+1 = NIt+1−(dNFAt+1+dWCt+1 − dDt+1).    (6) 
where dNFAt+1  (=Investment in Fixed Assetst+1 − Depreciationt+1) represents the so-called net 
capital expenditure. 
By contrast, a frequent definition in textbooks considers an “operating” or “noncash” notion of 
cash flow to equity, by excluding interest income from the net income and excluding change in 
liquid assets from the working capital. As noted, it is often named Free Cash Flow to Equity 
(Damodaran, 1999, 2006b). Formally, it is given by 
FCFEt+1 ≡  NIt+1−iLAt(1−T)− (dNFAt+1+dWCnct+1− dDt+1)   (7) 
with WCnc being noncash (operating) working capital: WCnct+1=WCt+1−LAt+1, so that 
dARt+1+dInvt+1−dAPt+1 = dWCnct+1 (see, for example, Damodaran, 1999, p. 128; Damodaran, 
2006a, p. 79). Hence,  
FCFEt+1 = CFEt+1 +dLAt+1 − iLAt(1−T), 
which is just eq. (3). 4 
 
2. The use of potential dividend in firm valuation  
Damodaran (2006b) acknowledges the valuation divergences derived from using 
potential dividends rather than actual cash flows. After presenting a notion of cash flow to 
equity equal to dividends paid to shareholders, he extends the definition to include share 
repurchases: “we extend our definition of cash returned to stockholders to include stock 
buybacks, thus implicitly assuming that firms that accumulate cash by not paying dividends 
return use them to buy back stock.” (Damodaran, 2006b, p. 19). This definition (which is 
strikingly similar to ours) is soon dismissed in favour of a notion of cash flow to equity that 
includes excess cash (the FCFE above): he writes that “the free cash flow to equity model does 
                                                            
4 It is worth noting that it is rather hard to grasp a univocal definition of cash flow to equity in many applied finance 
textbooks. Given their non-scientific purpose, there isn’t any use of formalism, and ordinary language is used in a 
rather loose way: the same terms may denote different things in different places of the book, and several different 
terms are used for equal concepts. Also, there is no standard terminology so different authors may use the same set 
of terms in rather different ways, increasing the difficulties in understanding.  For example, the removal of after-tax 
interest income in Damodaran (2006a) must be inferred from careful reading: “If using net income to estimate cash 
flows to equity, you need to remove after-tax interest income” (Table 10.1, p. 345). Also, at p. 337: “we would first 
back out the portion of the net income that represents the income from financial investments … and use the noncash 
net income to estimate free cash flows to equity” (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000, essentially use numerical 
examples and Tables, so that the task of abstraction is even more demanding). Only a thorough investigation of the 
authors’ perspectives and careful inspections of the examples provided enable one to formulate simple definitions 
such as the one in eq. (7).  
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not represent a radical departure from the traditional dividend discount model” (p. 20) even 
though he is aware that this model implies a well-determined assumption: “When we replace the 
dividends with FCFE to value equity, we are doing more than substituting one cash flow for 
another. We are implicitly assuming that the FCFE will be paid out to stockholders” (p. 21). He 
is perfectly aware that this assumption is harmless only if the excess cash “is invested in fairly 
priced assets (i.e. assets that earn a fair rate of return and thus have zero net present value)” (p. 
24). He correctly observes that “when the FCFE is greater than the dividend and the excess cash 
either earns below-market interest rates or is invested in negative net present value assets, the 
value from the FCFE model will be greater than the value from the dividend discount model” (p. 
24). And he himself admits that “there is reason to believe that this is not as unusual as it would 
seem at the outset” (p. 24). Nevertheless, in his textbooks and papers he seems to contravene his 
very arguments, given that he favours the potential-dividends model over the other ones: 
 
Actual dividends … may be much lower than the potential dividends (that could have been paid out) … 
When actual dividends are less than potential dividends, using a model that focuses only on dividends will 
under state the true value of the equity in a firm. (Damodaran, 2008, slide 106) 
 
It is worth noting that the author, instead of inferring that potential dividends overstate the value 
of a firm, infers that actual cash flows understate the value of a firm, so reversing a basic tenet 
in finance, according to which an economic asset is valued for the cash flow it pays off, not for 
the cash flow it could pay. 
 
Also, 
 
firms do not always pay out what they can afford to in dividends. A more realistic estimate of equity value 
may require us to estimate the potential dividend—the cash flow that could have been paid out as a 
dividend (Damodaran, 2006a, p. 111) 
 
Obviously, the fact that firms do not pay out what they can afford is not a good reason for 
favouring potential dividends as opposed to actual cash flow. Quite the contrary, if firms do not 
pay out cash flows that is available, then value is affected; in principle, whatever the magnitude 
of potential dividends, if a firm pays out no dividend over the life of the enterprise, the equity’s 
value is zero, as MM correctly recognize (MM, p. 419, footnote 12). And this is true even if the 
firm has invested in positive NPV projects (see also DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006): what’s the 
use of investing in positive NPV projects if shareholders will never receive any cash flow? As a 
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simple example: suppose shareholders contribute 100 dollars and managers invest those 100 
dollars at a rate of return above the cost of capital (positive NPV). Suppose also that managers 
never liquidate the compound amount to shareholders: then, shareholders’ wealth is decreased 
by 100 dollars, because they have suffered an outlay with no subsequent positive payoff.5 
 
Benninga and Sarig (1997, p. 36) share Damodaran’s view:  
Free Cash Flow (FCF) [is] a concept that defines the amount of cash that the firm can distribute to security 
holders … Cash and marketable securities are the best example of working capital items that we exclude 
from our definition of [change in net working capital], as they are the firm’s stock of excess liquidity”. 
 When calculating cash flow to equity these authors do not subtract dLAt+1, which entails that 
they abide by eq. (7) above (they make use of the term “net working capital” while meaning 
“operating net working capital”, inclusive of change in liquid assets).  
Copeland, Koller and Murrin’s (1990, 1994, 2000) (henceforth CKM) definition of free cash 
flow is consistent with Damodaran’s and Benninga and Sarig’s: they define it as “gross cash 
flow (NOPLAT plus depreciation) minus gross investment (increases in working capital plus 
capital expenditures)”(CKM, 2000, p. 138). Like Benninga and Sarig, they employ the 
expression “working capital” but refer to “operating working capital”, as they explicitly state at 
p. 168. As a consequence, their definition of cash flow to equity does not exclude dLAt+1, 
whereas it includes after-tax interest income (as they may be inferred by their Tables: no clear 
definition is given in the book. See, for example, CKM, 1994,  p. 480, Exhibit 16.3; CKM, 
2000, Exhibit 21.2 at p. 430 and Exhibit 21.10 at p. 438). Admittedly, in the first edition of their 
book (CKM, 1990) they seemed to be inclined to accept a strict definition of cash flow to equity 
as cash flow paid to shareholders: in their Exhibit 13.2 at p. 379 one finds, referred to equity, 
Free Cash Flow = Dividends to equity 
and in the same page they explicitly refer to “free cash flow to shareholders, which is 
mathematically identical to dividends”. Yet, from the second edition of their book a radical shift 
toward potential dividends is consummated, albeit with no justification. 
Brealey and Myers (2003, p. 75) write that “free cash flow is the amount of cash that a firm can 
pay out to investors after paying for all investments necessary for growth.” Therefore, while not 
                                                            
5 But see footnote 2 above. 
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being explicit, they seem to share the above mentioned authors’ stance. Their notion of working 
capital is consistent with the above mentioned authors, who do not subtract the change in liquid 
assets: “Working capital summarizes the net investment in short-term assets associated with a 
firm, business or project ... Working capital = inventory + accounts receivable – accounts 
payable.” (p. 126). 
 
While the practice of using potential dividends for valuing firms is a widespread one, there are 
some authors who consider it an error and correctly use only actual payments to shareholders for 
defining cash flow to equity. For example, Fernández (2002, p. 171) clearly states that “the 
forecast equity cash flow in a period must be equal to forecast dividends plus share repurchases 
in that period” and “the ECF in a period is the increase in cash (above the minimum cash, whose 
increase is included in the increase in WCR) during that period, before dividend payments, share 
repurchases and capital increases” (Fernández, 2002, p. 172); “considering the cash in the 
company as an equity cash flow when the company has no plans to distribute it” (Fernández, 
2007, p. 26) is a frequent error in real-life applications:  
 
In several valuation reports, the valuer computes the present value of positive equity cash flows in years 
when the company will not distribute anything to shareholders. Also, Stowe, Robinson, Pinto, and 
McLeavey (2002)  say that “Generally, Equity Cash Flow and dividends will differ. Equity Cash Flow 
recognizes value as the cash flow available to stockholders even if it is not paid out.” Obviously, that is not 
correct, unless we assume that the amounts not paid out are reinvested and obtain a return equal to Ke (the 
required return to equity). (Fernández, 2003, p. 10) 
 
His notion of working capital explicitly includes liquid assets: 
WCR = Cash +Accounts receivable + Inventories − Accounts payable 
(e.g. Fernández, 2002, p. 39), where “Cash” is Fernández’s term for “liquid assets”. 
Accordingly, his definition of equity cash flow is equivalent to our eq. (6) (Fernàndez, 2002, p. 
178 and Tables 9.6-9.8 at pp. 179-181). Cash flows to equity must necessarily include excess 
cash, “otherwise, we will be making hypotheses about what use is given to the part of the equity 
cash flow that is not used for dividends (cash, investments, repaying debt, etc.) and it will be 
necessary to subtract it beforehand from the equity cash flow” (Fernández, 2002, p. 179): 
Shrieves and Wachowicz (2001, p. 35) commendably stress that working capital is inclusive of 
cash and marketable securities. Their eq. (2) defining cash flow paid to shareholders is 
equivalent to our eq. (6) above (they use the symbol Div to mean net payments to shareholders). 
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They correctly notice that by omitting liquid assets from the notion of working capital cash 
flows are overstated and observe that such an omission is harmless only if potential liquid assets 
are zero NPV investments.  
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) argue that a firm’s equity is not given by potential dividends 
but by cash flows paid to shareholders. The former (they label them “free cash flow”) 
determines the investment value, the latter leads to the distribution value: “Investment value is 
the discounted value of the FCF to the firm generated by its investment policy, which 
determines the firm’s capacity to make payouts. Distribution value is the discounted value of the 
cash payouts to currently outstanding shares, i.e., the cash flow paid to stockholders, which 
determines the market value of equity”  (p. 16, italics in original). They underline that “value is 
generated for investors only to the extent that this capacity is transformed into actual payouts” 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 309). Only if “the full PV of FCF is distributed to investors, 
variation in the timing of the stream of payouts and in their form (e.g. dividends versus stock 
repurchase) has no effect on stockholder wealth” (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007, p. 25). 
 
Penman (2007, p. 39) underlines that “Owner’s equity increases from value added in business 
activities (income) and decreases if there is a net payout to owners. Net payout is amount paid to 
shareholders less amount received from share issues. As cash can be paid out in dividends or 
share repurchases, net payout is stock repurchases plus dividends minus proceeds from share 
issues”. He also writes that “it is noncontroversial that the price of a security is expressed as the 
‘present value’ of the expected future payoffs to holding the security” (Penman, 1992, p. 466), 
where ‘payoffs’ unambiguously refers to “the payoffs for equity securities” (p. 466). His notions 
of “net cash flow to shareholders” (p. 239) or “net dividend” (p. 241) are consistent with our 
notion of cash flow to equity:  
Net dividend= Cash dividend +Share repurchases−Share Issues 
(p. 241, Microsoft Corporation example). However, while he is perfectly aware that “The theory 
of finance describes equity valuation in terms of expected future dividends” (Penman and 
Sougiannis, 1998, p. 348), in his textbook he explicitly adopts the convention of assuming that 
dividend irrelevance holds (Penman, 2007, p. 96), so that using either net dividend or cash flow 
available for distribution is immaterial to the final result. 
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3. Some reasons for using actual cash flows rather than potential dividends   
This section summarizes some reasons for including in the cash flow only what indeed is 
a flow of cash. 
Cash flows in and out of the firm. If a firm does not pay out cash flow, no value is created to 
shareholders. Firm is an entity separated from shareholders: if firm generates large amounts of 
cash flows, this does not automatically make shareholders richer. It depends both on the 
magnitude of the cash flows and on the fact that those cash flows are actually paid out to 
shareholders. Inflows for capital providers are outflows for the firm and viceversa, so the value 
of the firm for shareholders does not lie in the funds retained by the firm, but in the funds that 
are withdrawn from the firm by shareholders. To retain funds is a good choice only if those 
funds will provide, sooner or later, sufficient payouts to shareholders above the cost of capital. 
Shareholders’ wealth does not increase if cash is not actually pulled out from the firm and 
distributed to shareholders. In other words, the investment value of a firm is different from the 
distribution value of a firm (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007). Only distribution value counts for 
shareholders. To assume that potential dividends are actually pulled out of the firm is like trying 
to pull potential rabbits out of actual hats. 
Consistency between cash flows and financial statements. There should be a complete 
consistency between cash flows and financial statements. If one assumes that every dollar 
available belongs to the equity holders, then that fact should be reflected in the financial 
statement. That is, those funds should appear as effectively distributed. If management is 
expected to invest retained funds in marketable securities, that decision should appear in the 
financial statements. Likewise, if cash holdings are invested in additional operating assets, that 
decision should be included in the analysis; if they are devoted to acquisitions or buyouts, again, 
that decision should be reflected in the cash flows with all the financial implications it has. The 
objection according to which retained funds may be useful for various reasons to shareholders 
(flexibility, high costs of external financing etc.) is not acceptable: retained funds are an equity 
contribution shareholders are forced to, so the issue is: will flexibility due to retained funds lead 
to higher payments to shareholders with respect to the case of distribution of those retained 
funds? Will internal financing lead to higher expected cash flows to shareholders? If the answer 
is “yes”, then those very higher cash flows should be reflected in the prospective financial 
statements, and expected payments to shareholders will directly incorporate the benefits of 
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flexibility, internal financing and so on. Otherwise, the reasons provided are only a way to 
disguise interests at variance with shareholders’ interests. 
 
Modigliani and Miller’s approach. Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) approach to firm 
valuation only takes account of cash flows paid to investors. There are no “potential dividends” 
in their articles. The same is true even in MM (1961) where the irrelevance of dividends is 
proved. As DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) underline, in MM’s 1961 paper there are no 
retained funds, and the assumption is “to mandate 100% free cash flow payout in every period” 
(p. 293). MM do not deal with potential dividends retained in the firms and invested in liquid 
assets. There are no investments in liquid assets in MM (1961). MM’s thesis may be extended to 
the case of retention of free cash flow only if that investment is made at the opportunity cost of 
equity and “provided that managers distribute the full present value of FCF” (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2006, p. 303. See also Magni, 2007). The latter assumption is, as previously noted, 
no less important than MM’s assumption of “fairly-priced assets”.  
It is never sufficiently stressed that irrelevance holds if and only if a perfect market exists 
where excess cash is invested in zero-NPV investments (and the full value is distributed to 
shareholders). In real life, excess cash is invested in liquid assets at some available rate that 
might be greater, equal or lower than the cost of equity. This means that the NPV of those 
undistributed funds can be greater, equal or less than zero. Thus, the use of potential dividends 
makes a valuation insensitive to the managers’ choices regarding the excess cash, whereas it is 
highly dependent on it. 
 
Zero-NPV assumption in real-life applications. One argument often used to justify inclusion 
the cash holdings as a cash flow is just that: the net present value of those investments is zero. 
Theoretically speaking, if one explicitly makes this assumption (along with the assumption of 
full distribution), then the firm’s equity will be the correct one. But, if this assumption is made, 
one should support it with some empirical evidence. In constructing pro-forma financial 
statements (forecasting) one should look at the history of the firm, estimate the historical returns 
on those funds and forecast them accordingly to some historical average return. If the forecasted 
return is lower than the cost of capital, then value is destroyed. If it is higher, a creation of value 
occurs. The idea of automatically assuming, without any serious investigation on the past 
management’s behaviors, that investments in liquid assets will be value-neutral, boils down to 
disregarding management’s policies. Evidently, management’s policies are relevant: retained 
funds may be kept in safe box, in the bank, in an investment fund, etc.  
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A stockholder would not accept to be virtually rewarded with “potential” dividends that 
never go to her pocket; likewise, banks or, in general, debt holders would not accept that interest 
or principal payments should be paid with “potential” interest and principal payments. 
Therefore, why should we expect that shareholders accept to consider retained funds as actual 
cash flows? 
 
Agency theory. Although corporate financial theorists and practitioners may conveniently 
employ the assumption of value-neutral investment in liquid assets, in practice such assumptions 
are very rarely fulfilled, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) underline. So, there 
is a need for distinguishing between potential cash flow available for distribution and actual 
cash flow effectively paid out to capital providers. The existence itself of this kind of problem is 
a confirmation that the assumption of value-neutral investment in liquid assets by managers is 
empirically unacceptable in most cases. If managers’ interests (and actions) were aligned to the 
shareholders’ interests, then managers would not waste money in negative NPV investments. In 
this case, managers would invest retained funds either in zero-NPV investment or in positive-
NPV investments. In the former case potential dividends could replace actual cash flows in firm 
valuation, but in the latter case the positive NPV should be reflected in the prospective financial 
statements, as seen above. The fact that in theory managers may undertake zero-NPV 
investments and should distribute the available cash that is not used for positive NPV 
investments does not imply that in practice the analyst should believe in such assumptions: “the 
theory is empirically refutable, predicting that firms will distribute the full PV of FCF, an 
implication that differentiates it from Jensen’s (1986) agency theory” (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2006, p. 295). 
 
4. Some simple formalizations   
We formalize in this section three simple arguments that aim at logically supporting the 
thesis according to which undistributed dividends do not add value to shareholders (and 
therefore must not be included in the definition of Cash Flow to Equity). In particular, they 
show that the use of potential dividends for valuation:  (a) does not comply with the CAPM, (b) 
does not comply with the basic tenet of valuation theory, (c) does not comply with the no-
arbitrage principle. 
Potential dividends and CAPM. The use of undistributed potential dividends is in clear 
contradiction with the Capital Asset Pricing Model. When the CAPM is used to estimate the 
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cost of equity, ke, one uses dividends paid out to calculate the historical stock returns and 
historical beta; one never uses potential dividends. 
 
Proposition 1.  Suppose (i) an investor uses the CAPM for computing the cost of equity and (ii) 
uses potential dividends for valuation. Then, the firm lies on and above the SML. 
 
Assume, with no loss of generality, dLAt+1 > iLA(1−T) (funds are retained by the firm). Due to 
(i), the following relation holds: 
)( fmefe rrrk −+= β      (8) 
with 2e )/~ ,~cov( mme rr σβ =  , where 1E/F~~ t1t −= +er  is the random rate of return and 1tF~ +  denotes 
the cum-dividend equity value at time t+1. This implies  
ek+
= +
1
F
E 1tt       (9a) 
with 1tF +  being the expected value of 1tF
~
+ . However, due to (ii), excess cash is discounted as 
well, so that 
ek
i
+
−−+= ++
1
)T1(LAdLAF
E t1t1tt .     (9b) 
Eqs. (8) and (9a)  tell us that the firm lies on the SML, whereas (9b) tells us that the firm lies 
above the SML, given that it implies  
t
t1t
t
t1t
t
1t
E
)1(LAdLA
)(
E
)1(LAdLA
1
E
Ti
rrr
TiF
k fmefe
−−+−+=−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= +++ β . 
 
The basic tenet of valuation theory. Section 1 has shown that our definition of CFE is 
consistent with MM’s approach to valuation. MM, in turn, strictly abide by a basic tenet of 
valuation theory: value depends on cash flow actually received by the investor. This tenet may 
be formalized as: 
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ek+
+= ++
1
rsshareholde  topaid FlowCash E
E 1t1tt     (10) 
(see, for example, Miller and Modigliani, 1961, eq. (2)). 
Proposition 2.  Suppose (i) an investor uses potential dividends for valuation and (ii) accepts 
the basic tenet of valuation theory. Then, she incurs contradictions. 
Note that one must have dLAt+1 ≠ iLAt(1−T), otherwise the use of potential dividends is 
meaningless. From (i), we have 
Et+1 = Et(1+ke)−FCFEt+1.     (11) 
 But 
Cash Flow paid to shareholderst+1 = FCFEt+1 − dLAt+1+iLAt(1−T)   (12) 
for, by definition, dLAt+1 − iLAt(1−T) represents retained funds not distributed to shareholders. 
From (ii),we have Et+1 = Et(1+ke)−Cash flow paid to shareholderst+1. Replacing (12) in the latter,  
we have 
Et+1 = Et(1+ke)−(FCFEt+1 −dLAt+1+iLAt(1−T)) 
we find, owing to (11),  dLAt+1− iLAt(1−T) = 0, which contradicts the hypothesis. 
The arbitrage argument. As is well-known, the no-arbitrage principle is a cornerstone in 
financial theory (Varian, 1987) and decision theory (Smith and Nau, 1994), and, more generally, 
represents a norm of rationality in economics (Nau and McCardle, 1991).  
Proposition 3. Suppose an investor uses potential dividends for valuation. Then, she is open to 
arbitrage losses. 
By assumption, investors in the market use eq. (3) (or, equivalently, eq. (7)) to value assets. Let 
us consider a firm traded in the market: let a~  be the periodic (random) payment to shareholders, 
and let b~  represent (random) undistributed potential dividends (excess cash). Given that 
investors positively evaluate b~ , then the market price of b~  is 
i
b  where b is the expected value 
of b~  and i represents some (positive) expected rate of return. However, according to eq. (3), 
both payments to shareholders and excess cash are discounted to compute the equity market 
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value. The latter is then priced at 
r
a  +
i
b  where r is the appropriate discount rate (possibly equal 
to i) for a  (expected value of a~ ). An arbitrageur fixes two amounts h1, h2 > 0, so that h1 +h2 < 
i
b  and proposes an investor a contract whereby the investor pays the arbitrageur an immediate 
sum equal to (
r
a  +
i
b − h1) and the arbitrageur guarantees periodic payments equal to those 
distributed by the firm to its shareholders. To the investor, this contract is equivalent to directly 
owning the firm’s equity. The market value of the firm’s equity is 
r
a  + 
i
b , but she only spends 
(
r
a  +
i
b − h1) to receive that value. Therefore, NPV is positive to the investor:  
NPV= h1 > 0 
so she accepts the contract. Then, the arbitrageur proposes a second contract whereby the 
investor immediately receives from the arbitrageur an amount equal to (
r
a + h2) and periodically 
pays off the arbitrageur an amount equal to the cash flow that will be distributed by the firm to 
its shareholders. The investor accepts again, because she will pay a~ , whose present value is 
r
a , 
but immediately receives  a greater amount, so that 
NPV= h2 > 0. 
This strategy results in an arbitrage loss for the investor and an arbitrage profit for the 
arbitrageur (see Table 1). (To avoid arbitrage, one needs to value excess cash at zero). 
To sum up: 
From Proposition 1: if one uses the CAPM for computing the cost of equity, then one 
may not use potential dividends for valuation  
From Proposition 2: if one uses potential dividends for valuation, then one does not 
accept the basic tenet of valuation theory 
From Proposition 3: if one does not accept the basic tenet of valuation theory, one is 
open to arbitrage losses. 
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Table 1. Arbitrage loss for an investor  
who uses eq. (3) for valuation 
 Cash flows to the investor* 
 time 0 time  t = 1, 2, 3, … 
First contract − 
r
a
 − 
i
b  + h1 a~  
Second contract
r
a + h2 a~−  
Total h1+ h2 − i
b  < 0 0 
*The cash flows to the arbitrageur are the same cash flows changed in sign 
 
 
Conclusions 
Economics, and in particular, financial economics provide rigorous theoretical tools for valuing 
assets. The theory is unambiguous in stating that the value of an asset depends on the cash flow 
actually received by investors, not on the cash flows that could be received. If excess cash is 
retained within the firm, it may be invested in zero- or nonzero-NPV activities. If it is invested 
in zero-NPV activities and their full present value is distributed to shareholders (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2006, Magni, 2007), then the use of potential dividends is equivalent to the use of 
actual net payments to shareholders. If it is invested in nonzero-NPV investments, one is bound 
to explicitly forecast the payout policy of the firm, to avoid to overstate the firm’s value. 
Whatever the assumption, the use of actual payments always leads to the correct value. 
If, historically, the firm has not distributed all the available cash or if investment in 
liquid assets has not been a zero-NPV investment, then one should be careful in assuming that 
the investment policy and the payout policy will change in the future. While some authors 
correctly recognize that only cash flows paid to shareholders should be used for valuation 
(Vélez-Pareja, 1999, 2004, 2005; Shrieves and Wachowicz, 2001; Fernández, 2002, 2007; Tham 
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and Vélez-Pareja, 2004; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, 2007), several authors in applied 
corporate finance and a large part of practitioners use potential dividends for computing a firm’s 
equity value (e.g. Benninga and Sarig, 1997; Damodaran, 1998, 2006; Copeland, Koller and 
Murrin, 1994, 2000) This paper aims at showing that the practice of adding excess cash to the 
cash flows actually paid is at odds with finance theory. Cash Flow to Equity should be defined 
as dividends paid minus net capital contributions, i.e. dividends plus shares repurchases minus 
new equity investment. 
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Main notational conventions 
AP Accounts Payable 
AR Accounts Receivable 
C Cash 
CFE Cash Flow to Equity 
FCFE Free Cash Flow to Equity (potential dividends) 
CS Capital stock 
d Variation symbol 
D Debt (book value) 
Div Dividends 
E Equity market value 
EBV Equity book value 
F~ , F  Cum-dividend equity market value (random and expected) 
FCF Free Cash Flow 
i Return rate for excess cash 
Inv Inventories 
ke Cost of equity 
LA Liquid assets 
NFA Net Fixed Assets (fixed assets minus accumulated depreciation) 
NI Net income 
STI Short-term investment 
T Tax rate 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
WC Working capital 
WCnc noncash Working Capital 
eβ  Beta of equity 
rf, mr  Risk-free rate, expected market rate of return 
2
mσ  Variance of market rate of return 
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